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INTRODUCTION
18 U.S.C. § 1346 criminalizes mail and wire fraud schemes whose
object-rather than stealing money or property-is to deprive the vic-
tim of "honest services."1 Under this statute, the U.S. government
prosecuted several former Enron Corp. (Enron) executives and their
investment bankers for executing a sham transaction and falsely re-
porting to shareholders that Enron had met its financial targets. 2 But
in a split decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed the convictions, holding that the defendants' fraudu-
lent conduct did not deprive Enron of its right to honest services. 3
Unfortunately, the majority's analysis completely overlooked one key
corporate constituency: Enron's shareholders. This Note argues that
a proper analysis of "honest services fraud" in the context of a public
corporation must take shareholders into account. Although there
may be cases in which overzealous prosecutors bring inappropriate
honest services charges, this was no such case. Rather, here a federal
court seized the opportunity to limit the reach of a vague statute and,
in so doing-intentionally or not-sanctioned inexcusable fraudulent
conduct.
In 1999, Enron was struggling to meet its forecasted earnings.4
To boost its year-end financial statements, Enron sought to sell an eq-
uity interest in three power-generating barges moored off the coast of
Nigeria. 5 Several Enron executives and bankers at Merrill Lynch &
Co., Inc. (Merrill) devised a scheme in which Merrill agreed to
purchase equity in the barges, allowing Enron to record $12 million in
earnings, but in which Enron also promised to buy back the barges at
1 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000) ("For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or
artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right
of honest services."). Before the enactment of § 1346, mail and wire fraud included only
schemes to deprive victims of money or property. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350 (1987); see also infra Part I (analyzing the progression of § 1346).
2 For background on this so-called "Nigerian Barge Transaction," see generally Third
Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner at 82-85, In re Enron Corp.,
340 B.R. 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 01-16034) [hereinafter Third Interim Report of
Neal Batson]; Kurt Eichenwald, An Enron Trial with Big Stakes for Ones Ahead, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 2004, at CI;John R. Emshwiller & Ann Davis, Deal's Wake: Tiny Transaction Is Big
Focus of Prosecutors in Enron Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2003, at Al; and Tom Fowler, The Fall
ofEnron: Enron Charges Hit Four from Merrill, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 18, 2003, at Bi. For back-
ground on the Enron scandal, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's
About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,"57 Bus. LAw. 1403 (2002); Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Collapse:
Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at A1;John R.
Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Corporate Veil: Behind Enron's Fall, A Culture of Operating
Outside Public's View, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2001, at Al; and Tom Fowler, The Fall ofEnron: A
Year Ago, Enron's Crumbling Foundation Was Revealed to All when the Company Reported Its Disas-
trous Third-Quarter Numbers, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 20, 2002, at Al.
3 United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2006).
4 Id. at 514.
5 Id. at 513.
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a premium six months later.6 As the Government proved at trial, the
buy-back agreement made this a loan, not a sale. In failing to disclose
the truth about the transaction, the executives committed fraud-par-
ticularly because Enron paid its executives handsome bonuses and
paid Merrill a $250,000 fee for completing the deal.7 The jury con-
victed the defendants on all counts, agreeing that they had deprived
Enron of their honest services.8
In United States v. Brown, the Fifth Circuit reversed and vacated
the convictions. 9 The court held that the alleged facts fell outside the
scope of honest services fraud because Enron itself sanctioned the
fraudulent transaction and intended to benefit from it.10 This Note
argues that the court erred by equating "Enron" with Enron's top-level
executives. Although certain executives sanctioned the transaction
and stood to benefit from it, the corporation as a whole-an entity
consisting of top-level executives, employees, and shareholders-did
not.
Brown is the latest in a long line of appellate cases interpreting
§ 1346 as applied in the private sector.11 In the public sector, the gen-
eral public has a right to the honest services of its public officials.' 2
This Note focuses on the private sector, where employees owe the
right of honest services to their employers.' 3 Brown raises questions
that are of central importance to private sector honest services fraud.
Unfortunately, the court's answers to these questions are unclear and
unpersuasive.
6 Id. at 514-16.
7 Id. at 516-17.
8 Id. at 517. The Government also charged the defendants with traditional "money
or property" wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Id. at 516. However, because the jury
convicted on all counts and was not asked to provide a special verdict, the Government had
to prove both theories on appeal. Id. at 518; see 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
9 459 F.3d at 531.
1o Id. at 522; see infta note 127 and accompanying text.
I1 See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000); see, e.g., United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.
2003) (en banc); United States v. Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320, 326 (4th Cir. 2001); United States
v. deVegter, 198 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 366
(6th Cir. 1997).
12 See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987) (describing "schemes to
defraud ... designed to deprive individuals, the people, or the government of intangible
rights, such as the right to have public officials perform their duties honestly"); United
States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc); United States v. Sawyer, 85
F.3d 713, 732 (lst Cir. 1996); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 1982);
see generally John C. Coffee,Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private Distinc-
tion, 35 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 427, 444-48 (1998) [hereinafter Modern Mail Fraud] (describing
the application of § 1346 to the public sector).
13 See Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 141-42 (defining "honest services" in the private sector to
mean services owed by "an officer or employee of a private entity (or a person in a relation-
ship that gives rise to a duty of loyalty comparable to that owed by employees to employ-
ers)" to the employer or to "[an]other person to whom the duty of loyalty is owed").
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Brown first raises the question of who exactly is the "employer" in
the context of a public corporation, and thus, to whom do employees
owe their honest services. Do employees owe honest services to the
managers (officers and directors), the owners (shareholders), or the
entity as a whole? Critics frequently argue that § 1346 is too vague to
afford potential defendants constitutionally adequate notice that their
conduct amounts to a federal crime. 14 To stay within the bounds of
the law, potential defendants need to know the persons to whom they
owe their honest services.1 5 A coherent answer to this question will
help solidify the constitutional footing of this statute. The court in
Brown implicitly concluded that "employer" refers only to the manag-
ers. 16 This Note will argue that a better analysis reveals that employ-
ees owe honest services to the corporation as a whole, including the
shareholders.
The second question that Brown raises is what legal effect should
be given to an employee who breaches a fiduciary duty to an em-
ployer, but who does so pursuant to a corporate policy. Unlike the
first issue, which is concerned with who owes honest services to whom,
this issue is concerned with the content of those services. Answering
this question will help resolve a second ambiguity in § 1346, which is
how to define the meaning of "honest services."1 7 This issue is of
14 See, e.g., Brown, 459 F.3d at 534 (DeMossJ., dissenting in part) ("Section 1346's text
is undeniably vague and ambiguous and is subject to wide variation in application by the
lower courts."); Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 156-58 (2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, J., dissenting)
("[S]ection 1346 is so vague that there is 'no set of circumstances' in which it is clear
enough to be applicable .... [T]his Circuit's long experience with section 1346 is ...
telling evidence that most lawyers and judges, not to speak of ordinary laymen or prospec-
tive defendants, cannot be expected to understand the statute." (quoting United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987))); Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal "Code" Is a
Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 660-66 (2006)
(describing in detail the vagueness of § 1346); Alex Hortis, Note, Valuing Honest Services:
The Common Law Evolution of Section 1346, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1099, 1110 (1999) ("[Section]
1346 is so vague that it forces federal courts to define the statute's terms and legislate the
offense from the bench."); Kelly Thornton, Vagueness of Statute on Corruption Stirs Dispute,
SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIBUNE, Jan. 12, 2006, at Al ("[I]t is a catchall statute that is ill-de-
fined ... and is a way for prosecutors to convert almost any kind of behavior into a fel-
ony .... The language in the 28-word statute is so vague that it can be applied to conduct
that doesn't fit into a specific category such as bribery.").
15 See, e.g., Richard M. Strassberg & Roberto M. Braceras, Circuit Grapples with "Honest
Services"Fraud, N.Y. L.J.,July 8, 2002, at 9 (describing a scenario in which "[a] client in the
midst of a nasty contract dispute braces herself for litigation .... but .... [i]nstead of a
summons and complaint, the client is arrested on an indictment brought by federal prose-
cutors who accuse her of mail and wire fraud for breaching the honest services she owed
under the contract").
16 Brown, 459 F.3d at 522; see infra Part III.
17 See, e.g., United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 104 (2d Cir. 2002) ("The plain
meaning of 'honest services' in the text of § 1346 simply provides no clue to the public or
the courts as to what conduct is prohibited under the statute."), overruled by Rybicki, 354
F.3d 124; Brumley, 116 F.3d at 736 (Jolly and DeMoss,JJ., dissenting) (criticizing the major-
ity for first acknowledging that the "meaning of 'honest services' . .. is ambiguous and
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great practical importance to the everyday lives of corporate employ-
ees. When a corporate policy sanctions fraudulent conduct, do em-
ployees have a duty to disclose or frustrate the policy, or a duty to
comply with it? Does the answer to this question depend on whether
the employee is a low-level clerk or a top-level executive? Unfortu-
nately, the Brown court devotes scant analysis to this issue and instead
simply concludes that the defendants are shielded from honest ser-
vices liability because their actions furthered a corporate policy.18
This Note will argue that, although compliance with a corporate pol-
icy should bar honest services liability in certain circumstances, those
circumstances are absent in Brown.19
Brown may have far-reaching implications, particularly if other cir-
cuit courts adopt its analysis. For one, it is likely to deter the govern-
ment from bringing honest services fraud charges, even when it would
be appropriate to do so. 20 Moreover, when prosecutors do bring hon-
est services charges, defendants will argue that Brown should extend to
new factual circumstances that the Fifth Circuit likely did not foresee
when it rendered its decision. This has already begun to happen in
several options-backdating prosecutions.2' Most problematically,
Brown adds to the confusion inherent in § 1346 by creating yet an-
other way that federal courts will apply the same criminal statute dif-
ferently. Thus, although the Fifth Circuit vacated the defendants'
convictions in Brown, it is incorrect to label the court's holding "de-
fense-friendly." 22 Potential defendants benefit from clarity in the law
undefined by Congress" and then "assum[ing] a role somewhere between a philosopher
king and a legislator to create its own definitions of the terms of [§ 1346]"); Sawyer, 85 F.3d
at 724 (noting that the definition of honest services "eludes easy definition"); David A.
Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, 8 U. PA.J. CONST. L.
809, 822 (2006) ("No one knows what a 'scheme or artifice to deprive another of the
intangible right of honest services' is, but thousands of people sit in federal prison con-
victed of intangible-rights mail fraud."); Robert G. Morvillo & RobertJ. Anello, Outer Limits
of Federal Mail, Wire Fraud Prosecutions, 237 N.Y. LJ., Apr. 3, 2007, at 3 ("In creating the
statute, Congress failed to provide a clear definition of 'the intangible right of honest ser-
vices,' leaving courts to delineate the limits of the statute.").
18 Brown, 459 F.3d at 522.
19 See infra Part IV.C.
20 Indeed, this is likely why federal prosecutors recently filed a motion to strike lan-
guage alleging honest services fraud from the indictment of three former British invest-
ment bankers. See United States' Motion to Strike the Honest Services Fraud Allegations
from the Indictment, United States v. Bermingham, No. CR-H-02-0597 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 4,
2006).
21 See, e.g., Gregory L. Reyes's Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Counts One
Through Seven of the Indictment Because They Are Permeated By an Invalid Theory of
Honest Services Fraud, United States v. Reyes, No. CR 06 0556 CRB (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9,
2007) 2007 'NrL 261401.
22 In fact, prosecutors recently announced that they will retry the defendants whose
convictions were vacated in Brown. See Kristen Hays, Barge Case Could Sail Again: Enron-
Merrill Retrial Likely in 2008 Unless There's a Deal, Attorneys Say, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 4, 2007,
at DI.
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so that they can be certain whether their conduct is lawful or not. Not
only should the circuit courts stop defining the contours of § 1346 ad
hoc, but Congress should finally amend the statute by defining its
terms and delineating the circumstances in which it applies.
Part I of this Note discusses the evolution of honest services fraud
from the development of the judge-made doctrine of "intangible
rights" in mail and wire fraud cases, to the invalidation of this ap-
proach by the Supreme Court in McNally v. United States, to Congress's
response with § 1346. Part II discusses the use of § 1346 to prosecute
fraud in the private sector and analyzes the various restrictions that
circuit courts apply to limit the scope of private-sector honest services
fraud. Part III describes the facts and opinions in Brown, and explains
the rule that the court invented to hold that the defendants' conduct
was outside the scope of honest services fraud. Part IV analyzes the
Brown rule and argues that it is premised on flawed assumptions
which, if corrected, reveal that the court's analysis lacks justification.
This Part also suggests a way to modify the rule into a more reasonable
approach.
I
THE EVOLUTION OF § 1346
Section 1346 states: "For the purposes of [mail and wire fraud],
the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice
to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." 2 3 Thus,
honest services fraud is not a substantive offense, but a way of commit-
ting mail and wire fraud.24
A. Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud
Congress passed the mail fraud statute in 1872 to curb the use of
the mails to perpetrate frauds. 25 The statute's sponsor stated that it
was needed "to prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the
large cities ... by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the
purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the coun-
try."2 6 The first real test of the statute's scope came in 1896 when the
Supreme Court faced the question of whether a "scheme to defraud"
23 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
24 Section 1346 also applies to bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344) and health care fraud
(18 U.S.C. § 1347). See 18 U.S.C. § 1346. Because it is used much more frequently for mail
fraud and wire fraud, this Note focuses on these two offenses.
25 The original mail fraud statute provided that "any person having devised or in-
tending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud... by means of the post-office ... shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor." Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
26 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 41st
Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (remarks of Representative Farnsworth)).
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should be interpreted narrowly-restricted by the common law defini-
tion of fraud-or read more expansively. 27  In Durland v. United
States,2s the Court adopted the expansive definition that fraud "in-
cludes everything designed to defraud by representations as to the
past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future."29
Today, the most striking feature of the mail fraud statute-and
the wire fraud statute, 30 which was enacted in 1952 and closely paral-
lels the mail fraud statute-is its breadth. As one former federal pros-
ecutor put it, "the mail fraud statute is our Stradivarius, our Colt 45,
our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart-our true love." 3 1 The offenses
are simple, requiring the government to prove only that the defen-
dant devised a scheme to defraud and used the mails or wires to exe-
cute the scheme. 32 This flexibility has enabled prosecutors to use the
27 See Paul M. Kessimian, Note, Business Fiduciary Relationships and Honest Services Fraud:
A Defense of the Statute, 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 197, 202 (2004) ("The real question be-
came whether or not the definition of fraud in the statute was limited by the common law
definition.").
28 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
29 Id. at 313; see also Brian C. Behrens, Note and Comment, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and
§ 1346: Deciphering the Confusing Letters of the Mail Fraud Statute, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV.
489, 494-95 (1993) (explaining that "[t]he Court went beyond the meaning attributed to
common law fraud," which included only misrepresentations or false pretenses concerning
past or present facts).
30 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
31 Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771 (1980);
see also PETER W. Low &JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAw 161 (1997) ("[M]ail
fraud continues to be the 'true love' of the federal prosecutor, a broad, self-defining stat-
ute that can be used to get crooks whose behavior falls between the cracks of other stat-
utes."); Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers:
Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 954 (1993) ("With regard to the
statutory weapons available to prosecutors, [mail and wire fraud] rank by analogy with
hydrogen bombs on stealth aircraft."); Behrens, supra note 29, at 526 ("[I]n a society where
an alarming number of ever-increasing crimes are occurring, the prosecutors need at least
one secret weapon. This 'catch-all' [mail fraud] statute may be the most important tool for
apprehending the new breed of crime-white collar crime.").
32 See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954) (regarding mail fraud); Skye Lynn
Perryman, Mail and Wire Fraud, 43 AM. CiuM. L. REV. 715, 718 (2006) ("[T]o be convicted
of a mail or wire fraud offense the government has to show beyo[n]d a reasonable doubt
that the defendant [perpetrated]: (i) a scheme to defraud that includes a material decep-
tion; (ii) with the intent to defraud; (iii) while using the mails, private commercial carriers,
and/or wires in furtherance of that scheme; (iv) that did result or would have resulted in
the loss of money or property, or in the deprivation of honest services."); see generally id. at
717-34 (explaining each element of the offense). The jurisdictional element of both stat-
utes is met by a mere showing of any mailing or interstate wiring that is "incidental" to an
essential part of the fraudulent scheme. See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705,
710-11 (1989);John C. Coffee,Jr. & Charles K. Whitehead, The Federalization of Fraud: Mail
and Wire Fraud Statutes, in O-rro G. OBERMAIER & ROBERT G. MORVILLO, 1 WHITE COLLAR
CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 9.01 (RobertJ. Anello et al. eds., 2007); see
also United States v. Wingate, 128 F.3d 1157, 1161-62 (7th Cir. 1997) ("'[The] element [of
the mailing being in furtherance of the scheme to defraud] is fairly easy to satisfy."' (quot-
ing United States v. Hickok, 77 F.3d 992, 1004 (7th Cir. 1996)) (second alteration in origi-
nal)); Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal Crimes, and Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
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statutes to combat "not only the full range of consumer frauds, stock
frauds, land frauds, bank frauds, insurance frauds, and commodity
frauds, but ... even ... blackmail, counterfeiting, election fraud, and
bribery."33 Prosecutors also use mail and wire fraud to prosecute
money-laundering and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO) violations. 34 Recent congressional action has broad-
ened the scope of mail fraud to include mailings via private carriers, 35
broadened the scope of wire fraud to include telemarketing fraud,36
and quadrupled the maximum punishment for both offenses from
five to twenty years' imprisonment.
37
B. "Intangible Rights" Theory
In the 1970s and 1980s, federal prosecutors persuaded lower fed-
eral courts to expand mail and wire fraud to include as the object of
the fraud certain "intangible rights" in addition to money and prop-
erty.38 Initially, prosecutors used this new theory of mail and wire
fraud to combat public corruption at the state and local levels. 39 For
POL'Y 117, 121 (1987) (explaining that the mail fraud statute has become a "vehicle for the
prosecution of an almost unlimited number of offenses bearing very little connection to
the mails").
33 Rakoff, supra note 31, at 772; see also Coffee & Whitehead, supra note 32, at § 9.01
("[T] his phrase[, 'scheme to defraud,'] has provided more expansive interpretations from
prosecutors and judges than probably any other phrase in the federal criminal law."); Al-
bert W. Alschuler, The Mail Fraud & RICO Racket, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 113, 114 (2006) ("The
Mail Fraud statute ... was the first statute to 'federalize' crimes against private individuals
that formerly were prosecuted only by state and local authorities.").
34 United States v. Goldin Indus., 219 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir. 2000) (defining
racketeering activity as the commission of certain federal crimes, including mail fraud);
United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming convictions for (i)
mail fraud in connection with bribes related to conspiracy to violate RICO, and (ii) wire
fraud in connection with a fraudulent campaign finance scheme); Perryman, supra note
32, at 716-17.
35 Section 1341, which originally applied only to United States Postal Service mailings,
was amended in 1994 to include commercial interstate carriers, such as FedEx and UPS.
See SCAMS Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 250006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2087 (1994) (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 2326 (2000)).
36 Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-184, 112 Stat. 520
(1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108 (2000)).
37 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 800 (2002) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); see Perryman, supra
note 32, at 717.
38 See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987) ("[E]ach of the Courts of
Appeals that has addressed the issue [has taken the approach that] schemes to defraud
include those designed to deprive individuals, the people, or the government of intangible
rights, such as the right to have public officials perform their duties honestly."); Alschuler,
supra note 33, at 114.
39 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models-And What Gan Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1879 (1992); Carrie A. Tendler,
An Indictment of Bright Line Tests for Honest Services Mail Fraud, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2729,
2733-34 (2004) ("At first, the intangible rights doctrine developed primarily in the public
sector.").
444
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example, a federal prosecutor may charge a public official who re-
ceives undisclosed kickbacks with depriving citizens of their right to
the official's honest and faithful services. 40
The intangible rights theory has also entered the private sector,
with prosecutors claiming that employers and principals have the
right to the honest services of their employees and agents. 4 1 Accord-
ing to one commentator, this development became an "exotic flower
that quickly overgrew the legal landscape in the manner of the kudzu
vine until by the mid-1980s few ethical or fiduciary breaches seemed
beyond its potential reach. '42 For example, in United States v. Bron-
ston,43 an attorney was convicted of mail fraud for secretly represent-
ing a client who was competing for a franchise; the competitor was
another client represented by the attorney's firm. 44 Although the at-
torney neither reaped profits through self-dealing nor misappropri-
ated a client's confidential information, the Second Circuit affirmed
the conviction based on an intangible rights theory because the attor-
ney failed to disclose his conflict of interest to the firm's client.45
Prosecutions of this sort traditionally received little resistance from
the courts-until McNally.4 6
40 See Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Opening Letters, 43. S.C. L. REv. 223, 233 (1992)
("Prosecutors indicted and convicted public officials pursuant to the intangible rights doc-
trine with a finding that they had deprived the citizenry of the right to good govern-
ment."); see also McNally, 483 U.S. at 362 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In the public sector,
judges, State Governors, chairmen of state political parties, state cabinet officers, city alder-
men, Congressmen and many other state and federal officials have been convicted of de-
frauding citizens of their right to the honest services of their governmental officials."); id.
at 362 n.1 (citing cases).
41 See Tendler, supra note 39, at 2734 & n.35 (citing United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d
754 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1985)).
42 Modern Mail Fraud, supra note 12, at 427.
4-1 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981).
44 Id. at 922-23.
45 Id. at 926-30. Many commentators view Bronston as a high-water mark case in the
development of pre-§ 1346 honest services fraud in the private sector. See Modern Mail
Fraud, supra note 12, at 434 ("Bronston thus crossed a critical threshold: before it, cases in
which there was only a conflict of interests, but neither a transaction between the fiduciary
and the client nor any misappropriation of information or property by the fiduciary from
the client, had been considered merely 'constructive fraud,' which did not amount to the
type of 'actual fraud' that transgressed the federal mail and wire fraud statutes."); Tendler,
supra note 39, at 2736 ("The facts of Bronston indicate that any lack of candor or good faith
to a former client ... violates the mail fraud statute."); Daniel Richman & Alan Vinegrad,
"Rybicki": The Intangible Rights Theory of Criminal Fraud, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 12, 2004, at 4 ("The
'honest services' theory flourished in the Second Circuit, and indeed reached what some
consider its disturbing high-water mark there." (citing Bronston, 658 F.2d at 920)).
46 But see United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 140-43 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winters, J.,
dissenting) ("[NJo amount of rhetoric ... can conceal that there is no end to the common
political practices which may now be swept within the ambit of mail fraud .... [W]hat
profoundly troubles me is the potential for abuse through selective prosecution and the
degree of raw political power the freeswinging club of mail fraud affords federal
prosecutors.").
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C. McNally v. United States
In McNally,47 the Supreme Court invalidated the intangible rights
doctrine, leading Congress to respond by enacting § 1346. McNally
involved three defendants: the chairman of the Kentucky Democratic
Party, who was responsible for selecting an insurance company to pro-
vide the state's workers'-compensation policies; a former Kentucky
state official; and McNally, a private individual.48 The defendants de-
vised a scheme in which the selected company, Wombwell Insurance,
shared its commissions in exchange for having its contract renewed.
49
The defendants were convicted of mail fraud and conspiracy to com-
mit mail fraud with the object of depriving the citizens of Kentucky of
their right to good government.50
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the "mail fraud statute
clearly protects property rights, but does not refer to the intangible
right of the citizenry to good government. '51 The majority found in-
sufficient evidence that Congress intended to depart from the tradi-
tional conception of fraud, which required a deprivation of money or
property.52 The majority did not suggest that it was implausible to
read the statute to include deprivations of intangible rights, but it ap-
plied the principle of lenity to choose the less harsh interpretation. 53
The Court invited Congress to "speak more clearly than it has" if it
desired to expand mail fraud to intangible rights. 5 4
47 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
48 Id. at 352-53.
49 Id.
50 The indictment charged that "petitioners had devised a scheme.., to defraud the
citizens and government of Kentucky of their right to have the Commonwealth's affairs
conducted honestly." Id. at 353-54.
51 Id. at 356.
52 See id. ("[T]he sparse legislative history .. . indicates that the original impetus be-
hind the mail fraud statute was to protect the people from schemes to deprive them of
their money or property."); id. at 357 ("Congress codified the holding of [Durland v.
United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896)] in 1909, and in doing so gave further indication that
the statute's purpose is protecting property rights."); id. at 358 ("[T]he words 'to defraud'
commonly refer 'to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes,'
and 'usually signify the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or over-
reaching."' (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924))).
53 Id. at 359-60 ("The Court has often stated that when there are two rational read-
ings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to choose the harsher only
when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language .... Rather than construe the
statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal
Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and state
officials, we read § 1341 as limited in scope to the protection of property rights." (citations
omitted)).
54 Id. at 360.
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In Carpenter v. United States,55 the Court explained that McNally
had not invalidated all intangible rights. 56 It held that the mail fraud
statute protects both tangible and intangible property rights. 57 Other
intangible rights, such as the right to honest services, remained
outside the scope of mail fraud. 58 As criticism of McNally mounted,5 9
Congress accepted the invitation to speak more clearly.
D. Congress Responds with § 1346
In 1988, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1346.60 Most agree that
the purpose of this statute was to overturn McNally.6 t This may be the
only aspect of § 1346 on which courts agree-and even here, they
agree to differing extents. Some circuit courts hold that § 1346 rein-
stated the pre-McNally case law;62 others hold that it did not;6 3 and still
55 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
56 Carpenter involved a Wall Street Journal columnist who shared confidential financial
information with two stockbrokers, for the purpose of trading on it for a profit, prior to the
information being published. Id. at 23-24. The Court held that the defendant deprived
theJournal not of his honest services, but of its intangible property right to the confidential
information. Id. at 25.
57 Id. at 27-28.
58 Id. at 25.
59 See Tendler, supra note 39, at 2737 (" [T] he McNally decision endured criticism.");
see, e.g.,JeffreyJ. Dean & Doye E. Green,Jr., Note, McNally v. United States and Its Effect on
the Federal Mail Fraud Statute: Will White Collar Criminals Get a Break, 39 MERCER L. REV. 697,
712 (1988) ("Regardless of the ultimate results of McNally, the opinion itself is unreasona-
ble and poorly supported."); Donna Metcalfe Ducey, Note, McNally v. United States: The
Demise of the Intangible Rights Doctrine, 66 N.C. L. REv. 1035, 1050 (1988) ("Congress should
supply language that recaptures the protections provided by the broad interpretation of
section 1341.... By eliminating an essential source of protection for victims of fraud, the
Court has immunized an entire group of criminals from prosecution.").
60 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4508
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000)).
61 Representative Conyers, speaking on the floor of the House, remarked, "This
amendment restores the mail fraud provision to where that provision was before the Mc-
Naty decision.... Thus, it is no longer necessary to determine whether or not the scheme
or artifice to defraud involved money or property. This amendment is intended merely to
overturn the McNally decision." 134 CONG. REc. H11251 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (state-
ment of Rep. Conyers) (italics added). Several weeks after the passage of the provision,
the Senate Judiciary Committee entered into the Congressional Record a report stating,
"[Section 1346] overturns the decision of McNally v. United States .... " 134 CONG. REC.
S17376 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) [hereinafter Senate Judiciary Committee Report]. See
generally United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 742-45 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Jolly
and DeMoss, JJ., dissenting) (describing the legislative history of § 1346).
62 See, e.g., United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 364 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[Section] 1346
has restored the mail fraud statute to its pre-McNally scope .... "); Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee Report, supra note 61, at S17376 ("The intent is to reinstate all of the pre-McNally
case law pertaining to the mail and wire fraud statutes without change.").
63 See, e.g., United States v. Sancho, 157 F.3d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1998) ("What the gov-
ernment must prove to satisfy this element of the offense is defined by Section 1346-not
by judicial decisions that sought to interpret the mail and wire fraud statutes prior to the
passage of § 1346."), overruled by United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (en
banc); Brumley, 116 F.3d at 733 ("Congress could not have intended to bless each and every
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others hold that, although Congress did not reinstate the law, courts
may refer to it when interpreting § 1346.64
Section 1346 created other ambiguities, the most prominent be-
ing what Congress meant by "honest services. ' 65 This ambiguity has
led many scholars and dissenting judges to argue that § 1346 is uncon-
stitutionally vague.66 So far, no circuit court has agreed. 6 7
Another source of potential ambiguity was whether Congress in-
tended to restrict § 1346 to public victim cases; that is, did Congress
seek only to respond to the specific facts of McNally, or did Congress
also intend to prohibit honest services fraud in the private sector?68
Courts and prosecutors have settled on the latter interpretation, but
not without generating significant confusion.
pre-McNally lower court 'honest services' opinion.... Congress, then, has set us back on a
course of defining 'honest services' . .. ).
64 See, e.g., Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 145 ("[W]e look to cases decided before the enactment
of section 1346 only in order to determine what section 1346 meant to Congress when it
enacted the statute. We do not think that that earlier case law is, after the intervening
occurrences of McNally and section 1346, 'precedent' in the sense that it sets forth rules of
law that we are bound to follow.").
65 See JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 545 (2d ed. 2003) (sug-
gesting that "honest services" could be interpreted as a short-hand for all the intangible
rights recognized by the courts of appeals prior to McNally, including the right to privacy);
see also supra notes 14 and 17 (citing relevant sources).
66 See United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 534 (5th Cir. 2006) (DeMoss, J., concur-
ring in part) (" [T]he constitutionality of § 1346 may well be in serious doubt.... Section
1346's text is undeniably vague and ambiguous and is subject to wide variation in applica-
tion by the lower courts.... Congress should repair this statute that.., fails to provide the
requisite 'minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement."' (quoting Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983))); Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 158 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) ("'The plain
meaning of "honest services" in the text of § 1346 simply provides no clue to the public or
the courts as to what conduct is prohibited under the statute."' (citation omitted)); Brum-
ley, 116 F.3d at 736-46 (Jolly, J., dissenting) (The majority opinion "holds that general,
undefined, vague, and ambiguous words constitute a clear statement that Congress in-
tended for federal prosecutors and grand juries to police the conduct of state officers
acting in their official state capacities .... The majority's attempt to define 'honest ser-
vices' demonstrates why such ad hoc definitions cannot possibly satisfy the requirements of
'fair notice' ....").
67 A panel of the Second Circuit found § 1346 unconstitutionally vague as applied to
a bid contractor working for a state school authority. United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d
92, 96-112 (2d Cir. 2002). But the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed this holding in
Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 144. See United States v. Williams, 441 F.3d 716, 724-25 (9th Cir. 2006)
(rejecting a claim that § 1346 is unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Hausmann, 345
F.3d 952, 958-59 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to § 1346); Brumley,
116 F.3d at 733 (conceding that some defendants "on the outer reaches of the [wire fraud]
statute" may be without adequate notice); see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and
the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 I-HAv. J. ON LEGIs., 153, 190-97
(1994) (discussing vagueness in honest services fraud). But see United States v. Czubinski,
106 F.3d 1069, 1077 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that the defendant could not be guilty of
honest services fraud because he lacked notice that his actions were criminal).
68 See O'SULLVAN, supra note 65, at 545.
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II
SECTION 1346 IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
As one court stated, "[T]he literal terms [of § 1346] suggest that
dishonesty by an employee, standing alone, is a crime."69 Thus, based
on "a need to avoid the over-criminalization of private relation-
ships,"70 courts have sought to prevent § 1346 from being applied "to
its logical extreme"71 in the private sector.72 The result has been a
patchwork of judicially created restrictions on honest services fraud,
applied without even the semblance of uniformity throughout the cir-
cuit courts. 73 For example, one commentator74 has found that cir-
cuits are split over what mens rea the prosecution must prove, 75
whether the defendant must have caused tangible harm,76 what duty
69 United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 368 (6th Cir. 1997).
70 Id. Commentators have also noted that different policy concerns are present in the
private sector than in the public sector. For example, public officials know that they work
for the public good, whereas privately employed individuals are more likely to be moti-
vated by their own economic interest. In addition, duties of loyalty are more common and
broader in the public sector than in the private sector. See Tendler, supra note 39, at 2741;
see also United States v. deVegter, 198 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[F]or a private
sector defendant to have violated the victim's right to honest services, it is not enough to
prove the defendant's breach of loyalty alone. Rather, as is always true in a breach of
loyalty by a public official, the breach of loyalty by a private sector defendant must in each
case contravene.., the purpose of the parties' relationship."); United States v. Lemire, 720
F.2d 1327, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Employee loyalty is not an end in itself, it is a means to
obtain and preserve pecuniary benefits for the employer.").
71 Frost, 125 F.3d at 368.
72 See Lemire, 720 F.2d at 1336 n.11 ("'[I1f merely depriving the victim of the loyalty
and faithful service of his fiduciary constitutes criminal fraud, the ends/means distinction
is lost. Once the ends/means distinction is abolished and disloyalty alone becomes the
crime, little remains before every civil wrong is potentially indictable."' (quoting John C.
Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and
the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 117, 167 (1981))).
73 See United States v. Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[C]ourts constru-
ing and applying § 1346 have consistently utilized certain principles to limit its scope in the
private employment context." (citations omitted)); O'Sullivan, supra note 14, at 663 ("Fed-
eral courts are now split every which way from Sunday on construction of this statute.").
74 Edward J. Loya, Jr., Note, Upholding "Honest Services" While Abandoning Interpretive
Principles: United States v. Rybicki, 10 SrAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 138, 139 (2004).
75 Compare United States v. Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir. 1999) (requir-
ing an intent to cause actual harm and, in most business contexts, financial or economic
harm), with Frost, 125 F.3d at 368 (requiring an intent to breach a fiduciary duty).
76 Compare United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(requiring proof that the misrepresentation or omission at issue was "material," such that
the misinformation or omission would naturally tend to lead or is capable of leading a
reasonable employer to change its conduct), with Vinyard, 266 F.3d at 327-28 (adopting
the reasonably foreseeable harm test), and Frost, 125 F.3d at 368 (requiring proof that the
employee foresaw or reasonably should have foreseen that the employee's employer might
suffer an economic harm as a result of the misrepresentation or omission).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:437
the defendant must have breached,77 and the source of such duty. 78
Generally, courts have narrowed the statute's reach by limiting the
type of relationships that can give rise to an honest services conviction
and by restricting the type of dishonest conduct that can trigger such
a conviction.
A. Restrictions Based on the Type of Relationship
In an honest services fraud case, all courts require that a relation-
ship exist in which the defendant owes honest services to the victim. 79
Most frequently, courts look for the existence of a fiduciary relation-
ship between the employer and employee.8 0 In the Seventh Circuit,
any fiduciary breach coupled with personal gain constitutes a depriva-
tion of honest services.8 ' But most courts additionally require an act
of deception-usually a failure to disclose the fiduciary breach.8 2
Some courts do not require proof of a fiduciary relationship, noting
that § 1346 does not, by its terms, require one.83 However, they do
require proof of a comparable relationship giving rise to a duty of
loyalty.8 4 In the absence of a fiduciary relationship-or a comparable
relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose-courts find a mere fail-
ure to disclose insufficient to establish a deprivation of honest ser-
vices.8 5 Rather, in such cases, they require proof of an affirmative,
material misrepresentation.8 6
77 Compare United States v. Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029, 1036 (8th Cir. 2000) ("We reject
the [defendant's] contention that § 1346 requires the breach of a fiduciary duty."), with
United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1077 (1st Cir. 1997) (discussing that in "honest
services convictions involving private fraud victims[,] ... there must be a breach of a fiduci-
ary duty to an employer").
78 Compare United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that
violation of § 1346 requires breach of duties owed under state law), with Frost, 125 F.3d at
366 (ruling that breach of fiduciary duty is defined according to federal law).
79 See United States v. Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 211 (2d Cir. 2002).
80 See United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399, 409 (5th Cir. 2002).
81 See United States v. Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952, 956 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
jury need only find that the defendant used the interstate mails or wires "in furtherance of
a scheme to misuse his fiduciary relationship for gain at the expense of the party to whom
the fiduciary duty was owed").
82 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud Meets Criminal Theory, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 19
(1998) ("In honest services frauds, the deception lies in failing to disclose a breach of
fiduciary duty to the principal." (citing United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 756 (1st Cir.
1987))).
83 United States v. Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029, 1036 (8th Cir. 2000) ("[W]hile we do not
doubt that a defendant's breach of a fiduciary duty in proper circumstances may be a
powerful indication that he also has deprived another of the right of honest services... the
breach of a fiduciary duty is not a necessary element of § 1346."); United States v. Sancho,
157 F.3d 918, 921 (2nd Cir. 1998) ("Section 1346 does not require the existence of a
fiduciary relationship."), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124
(2d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
84 Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 146.
85 Tendler, supra note 39, at 2756.
86 Id.
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B. Restrictions Based on the Type of Conduct
In considering the type of dishonest conduct sufficient to give
rise to an honest services violation, several circuits have decided be-
tween the "reasonably foreseeable harm" test and the "materiality"
test.8 7 The reasonably foreseeable harm test requires that the em-
ployee foresaw, or reasonably should have foreseen, that the employer
might suffer an economic harm as a result of the employee's misrep-
resentation or omission. 8 The materiality test requires proof that the
employee's fraud had the natural tendency to influence, or was capa-
ble of influencing, the employer to change its behavior.8 9 Courts also
look to whether the defendant's conduct harmed the victim and
whether it resulted in a personal benefit to the defendant-with some
courts requiring one or the other,9) and other courts requiring only
one.
9 1
In United States v. Rybicki, "the leading opinion on honest-services
fraud,' 9 2 the Second Circuit found that "private-sector honest services
cases fall into two general groups, cases involving bribes or kickbacks,
and cases involving self-dealing."93 In the bribery or kickback cases, a
defendant (e.g., a prospective supplier) who has or seeks some sort of
business relationship or transaction with the victim (e.g., a manufac-
turer of goods) secretly pays, or causes to be paid, the victim's em-
ployee (e.g., a person responsible for choosing a supplier) in
exchange for favored treatment (e.g., a supply contract).94 In the self-
dealing cases, the defendant employee typically causes the employer
87 See United States v. Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320, 327-28 (4th Cir. 2001).
88 Id. at 328-29 (adopting the reasonably foreseeable harm test "because it both
keeps the focus on employee intent and because it limits the scope of § 1346 to serious
harms"). This test has also been adopted in the First Circuit, United States v. Martin, 228
F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2000); the Eleventh Circuit, United States v. deVegter, 198 F.3d 1324,
1328-30 (11th Cir. 1999); the D.C. Circuit, United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal.,
138 F.3d 961, 973-74 (D.C. Cir. 1998); and the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Frost, 125
F.3d 346, 368-69 (6th Cir. 1997).
89 See Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 146 (adopting the materiality test "because it has the virtue
of arising out of fundamental principles of the law of fraud: A material misrepresentation is
an element of the crime"). This test has also been adopted by the Tenth Circuit, United
States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 665 (10th Cir. 1997); the Fifth Circuit, United States v.
Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 774-75 (5th Cir. 1996); and the Eighth Circuit, United States v. Jain, 93
F.3d 436, 441-42 (8th Cir. 1996).
90 See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 112 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1997) (requiring harm to
the victim or "'gainful use ... intended by the [defendant], whether or not this use is
profitable in the economic sense' " (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1074-75 (1st Cir. 1997))).
91 See, e.g., United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 656-57 (7th Cir. 1998) (requiring a
personal benefit to the duty-breaching employee); United States v. Ballard, 663 F.2d 534,
540 (5th Cir. 1981) (requiring a detriment to the employer).
92 United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 521 (5th Cir. 2006).
93 Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 139.
94 Id.
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to do business with an enterprise in which the defendant has a secret
interest.95 The court in Rybicki concluded that in bribery or kickback
cases, the undisclosed bribery itself suffices to constitute an honest
services violation; but in self-dealing cases, the defendant's behavior
must cause, or be capable of causing, some detriment to the em-
ployer.9 6 The court proceeded to formulate a single rule encompass-
ing the restrictions on both the type of relationships and the type of
dishonest conduct that may violate § 1346:
The phrase "scheme of artifice [to defraud] by depriv[ing] another
of the intangible right of honest services," in the private sector con-
text, means a scheme or artifice to use the mails or wires to enable
an officer or employee of a private entity (or a person in a relation-
ship that gives rise to a duty of loyalty comparable to that owed by
employees to employers) purporting to act for and in the interests
of his or her employer (or of the other person to whom the duty of
loyalty is owed) secretly to act in his or her or the defendant's own
interests instead, accompanied by a material misrepresentation
made or omission of information disclosed to the employer or other
person.
97
If the Fifth Circuit in Brown had applied existing federal law-in
any of its various formulations-it would have concluded that the de-
fendants were guilty of honest services fraud. Instead, the court
crafted yet another restriction on the type of conduct that may give
rise to an honest services violation. This restriction would be unjusti-
fied regardless of the case, and it is particularly incongruous in Brown
because its result is to sanction a fraud on an obviously innocent party:
the shareholders.
III
UNITED STATES V. BROWN
A. The Facts
This case derives from the so-called "Enron Nigerian Barge
Transaction. '9 8 This transaction involved two key participants from
inside Enron: Andrew Fastow, Enron's Chief Financial Officer (CFO);
95 Id. at 140.
96 Id. at 141.
97 Id. at 146-47 (alteration in original). In Brown, 459 F.3d at 521, the Fifth Circuit
cited this rule with approval, but noted that it had "couched [its] language more broadly in
terms of an understood divergence, rather than a secret conflict, of interests." Id. The court
further agreed that "bribery and self-dealing are the paradigmatic cases of honest-services
fraud." Id.
98 See, e.g., Third Interim Report of Neal Batson, supra note 2, at 82-85; Eichenwald,
An Enron Trial with Big Stakes for Ones Ahead, supra note 2, at CI; Emshwiller & Davis, supra
note 2, at Al; Fowler, The Fall of Enron: Enron Charges Hit Four from Merrill, supra note 2, at
B1.
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and Daniel Boyle, Enron's Vice President in Global Finance. 99 The
indictment named four defendants from inside Merrill. The first
three were managing directors: Daniel Bayly, head of Global Invest-
ment Banking; James Brown, head of Strategic Asset Lease and Fi-
nance; and William Fuhs, who worked under Brown. The fourth
defendant, Robert Furst, was Merrill's Enron relationship manager.' 0 0
In 1999, Enron found itself struggling to meet forecasted earn-
ings for the year's final quarter °" Executives, including Fastow, be-
gan pressuring Enron's Asia/Pacific/Africa/China Division
(APACHI) to monetize or sell assets in order to show a gain. To com-
ply, APACHI attempted to sell an interest in its primary asset, electric-
ity-generating power barges moored off the Nigerian coast. By
December, these prospective deals had collapsed, and Enron execu-
tives discussed the need for an "emergency alternative."1 0 2 Fastow
turned to Merrill, hoping that as a "friend of Enron," the bank would
"help Enron out. 1 0 3 Boyle took the lead in negotiating with Furst to
have Merrill buy the barges. Fastow orally promised to buy back the
barge investment within six months, guaranteeing Merrill at least a 15
percent return. 0 4 Within Merrill, both Brown and Fuhs expressed
concerns about manipulating Enron's income statement. 10 5 Bayly, ev-
idently more concerned about whether Enron would indeed buy back
the interest, asked for written assurance of Enron's promise. How-
ever, Enron executives told Bayly that such a written statement was not
possible because it "would prevent Enron from receiving the account-
ing treatment it sought with the deal."10 6 Nonetheless, the terms of
the deal were clear. As Boyle explained in an e-mail, "[Merrill's] deci-
sion to purchase the equity was based solely on personal assurances by
99 Although the indictment listed Fastow as a coconspirator, he was not named as a
defendant in Brown. See Superseding Indictment at 1, United States v. Brown, Cr. No. H-
03-363 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Indictment], affd in part, rev'd in part, and
vacated in part, 459 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2006). Instead, he was charged separately on an
indictment that listed ninety-eight criminal counts; he pleaded guilty and received a six-
year prison sentence. See Kristen Hays et al., Fastow Shown Mercy: Sentence Cut to 6 Years; The
Judge: Cites Cooperation, Family's Suffering; Tearful Defendant: "I Wish I Could Undo What I Did,"
Hous. CHRON., Sept. 27, 2006, at Al. In addition to Boyle, Sheila Kahanek, an Enron
accountant, was named as a defendant in Brown, but she was acquitted of all charges. See
Brown, 459 F.3d at 513.
100 See Indictment, supra note 99, at 437.
101 See Brown, 459 F.3d at 514.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 515.
105 Brown expressed his concerns to both Furst and Fuhs, and Fuhs communicated the
risk of "income manipulation" to a Merrill analyst. Id. at 514.
106 Id. at 515.
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Enron senior management to [Merrill] that the transaction would not
go beyond June 30, 2000."17
At the end of 1999, Enron recorded the barge deal and the result-
ing $12,563,000 in earnings. 108 This was a misrepresentation. Be-
cause of the buy-back agreement, Merrill's investment carried no risk
and was thus a loan, not a sale. In exchange for its participation, Mer-
rill received a $250,000 "advisory fee" from Enron. 109 And six months
later, Enron caused an entity called "LJM2"-operated and controlled
by Fastow' '°-to pay Merrill $7,525,000 for its interest in the barges, a
figure that represented exactly six-months' return at an annual rate of
fifteen percent. The Enron employees who helped effectuate the deal
received compensation bonuses as a reward. 11
The defendants were charged with wire fraud and conspiracy to
commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 (depriving Enron
of money or property) and 1346 (depriving Enron of its intangible
right to honest services). 1 12 Boyle was convicted on all counts and did
not appeal. The four Merrill defendants were convicted and
appealed. 1 3
B. The Opinions
Circuit Judge Jolly, writing for the majority, began by noting that
the Government proved all of the elements that are generally re-
quired for an honest services conviction. The Enron executives, Fas-
tow and Boyle, owed fiduciary duties to Enron. The executives
breached these duties, and thus the Merrill defendants were guilty of
causing them to be breached or conspiring with the Enron executives
to breach them by "the failure to disclose the full truth about the
barge transaction."' 1 4 The undisclosed information was material and
107 Id. (alteration in original). Further evidence of Fastow's involvement came from
an e-mail written by Brown in 2001. Referring to the Nigerian Barge Transaction, Brown
wrote, "[W]e had Fastow get on the phone with Bayly and lawyers and promise to pay us
back no matter what." Id.
108 Id. at 515-16.
109 Id. at 516.
110 The Merrill defendants Bayly, Brown, and Furst were also individual investors in
LJM2. As such, they continued to bear an interest in the barges. Id. at 516 n.2.
M Id. at 520.
112 Id. at 518. Brown was also charged with perjury before a GrandJury in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 1623 and 3551, and with obstruction of a GrandJury investigation in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 3551. He was convicted, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Id. at
516.
113 The court only evaluated the honest-services theory on appeal. It did so because
the trial court had not asked the jury to indicate the basis for its verdict, and thus the
Government was required to prove all its theories for the court of appeals to affirm. Id. at
518 (citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)).
114 Id. at 520.
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thus constituted an "inherent" harm to Enron. 115 Finally, the duty-
breaching employees garnered a personal benefit in the form of com-
pensation bonuses. 1 6 These facts alone would suffice for an honest
services conviction in any other circuit. Indeed, Judge Jolly conceded
that "the Government present[ed] a very plausible, even strong, case
for a criminal deprivation of honest services."' 1 7
Judge Jolly proceeded to announce that the restrictions placed
thus far on honest services fraud represented "only minimal distinc-
tions we have had occasion to declare" and that further "constraints...
[may be] appropriate to recognize."' 8 Turning to "a study of the case
law to understand what behavior justifies criminal liability," Judge Jolly
began with the Rybicki rule.11 9 Here, he found that the defendants'
"dishonest conduct [was] disassociated from bribery or self-dealing
and indeed associated with and concomitant to the employer's own
immediate interest.' 120 Judge Jolly emphasized the financial bonuses
that motivated the defendants to complete the barge deal, stating that
Enron's "incentive structure tying employee compensation to the at-
tainment of corporate earnings targets" led the employees to believe
that Enron's interest would "be furthered by a scheme involving a fi-
duciary breach.' 1 2' The opinion did not mention that the means of
furthering Enron's interests involved falsely reporting that Enron had
met earnings targets. 22 In judge jolly's view, the important point was
that the defendants "were driven by the concern that Enron would
suffer absent the scheme." 12 3 However, Judge Jolly did not consider
whether "Enron" might encompass more than just the top-level execu-
tives who implemented the incentives policy. It is doubtful, for exam-
ple, that Judge Jolly intended to suggest that the defendants were
concerned that Enron's shareholders would suffer absent the scheme.
Moreover, Judge Jolly's language seems to suggest that the court be-
lieved that the defendants did not intend to defraud Enron and there-
fore lacked the requisite mens rea. But he never actually drew this
115 Id. The court also noted that the payment of fees to Merrill and compensation
bonuses to Enron employees harmed Enron concretely. Id. Moreover, in response to the
defendants' argument that the barge transaction led to an increase in Enron's stock price
and thus immediately benefited Enron and its shareholders, the court stated that it would
"assume for purposes of this opinion that the alleged detriment [to Enron] satisfies that
element of honest-services fraud." Id. at 520 n.8.
116 Id. at 520.
117 Id.
118 Id.; see also id. ("[B]etween the core of cases affirming honest-services fraud convic-
tions and the shell of cases reversing them, there is a gap, a lacuna, a vacuum, a no-man's
land, a demilitarized zone, in which this case awkwardly sits alone.").
119 Id. at 520; see supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
120 Brown, 459 F.3d at 522.
121 Id.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 99-108.
123 Brown, 459 F.3d at 522.
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conclusion. Instead, he noted his concern with turning every fiduci-
ary breach into a federal crime1 24 and proceeded to suggest that the
defendants may not have "recognized, based on the nature of ... past
case law, that the 'employee services' taken to achieve [Enron's] cor-
porate goals constituted a criminal breach of duty to Enron."'12 5 This
language, by contrast, suggests that the court was unwilling to hold
the defendants guilty of honest services fraud because they lacked
constitutionally adequate notice. But rather than draw this conclu-
sion specifically, the court cryptically declared that "the scheme as al-
leged falls outside the scope of honest-services fraud."' 26
Thus, erecting a new restriction on honest services fraud, Judge
Jolly and the majority held:
[W]here an employer intentionally aligns the interests of the em-
ployee with a specified corporate goal, where the employee per-
ceives his pursuit of that goal as mutually benefiting him and his
employer, and where the employee's conduct is consistent with that
perception of the mutual interest, such conduct is beyond the reach
of the honest-services theory of fraud .... 127
Because it is unclear where this rule derives from-does it redefine an
element of § 1346? add an additional element? create an affirmative
defense?-it is impossible to know how to apply it in the future. In-
deed, Judge Jolly did not even explain how he applied it in this
case. 128
Circuit Judge DeMoss, concurring in part, wrote separately to
"reach the Defendants' constitutional challenge" and argued that
§ 1346 is unconstitutionally vague.1 29 Judge DeMoss criticized the cir-
cuit courts for "repeatedly resolving the ambiguities of the statute's
text via judicially created definitions and limitations" and argued that
Congress needs to repair the statute.'3 0
124 Id. at 519 ("[N]ot every breach of fiduciary duty owed by an employee to an em-
ployer constitute[s] an illegal fraud . . . ."); id. at 521 ("'[N]ot every breach of fiduciary
duty works a criminal fraud .... ' (citation omitted)); id. at 522 ("[W]e meet again our
oft-mentioned chariness of making every knowing fiduciary breach a federal crime.").
125 Id. at 522.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Adding to the perplexity of this opinion, the court sought to bolster its ruling by
applying the rule of lenity. Id. at 523. This doctrine holds that, when construing an ambig-
uous statute, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the more lenient punishment.
See BtACK's LAw DIcriONARY 1359 (8th ed. 2004). But here the court does not choose the
more lenient of two interpretations of § 1346. Rather, the court adopts a wholly new re-
striction and applies it to find conduct outside the scope of the statute that would other-
wise be plainly within its scope. In Part IV, this Note explores possible rationales for this
rule, criticizes its flaws, and proposes a way to modify the rule into a more justifiable one.
129 Brown, 459 F.3d at 534 (DeMoss,J., concurring in part).
130 Id.
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Circuit Judge Reavley, writing in dissent, argued that the convic-
tions should have been affirmed because § 1346 "applies to the behav-
ior in this case."',' He argued that the Enron executives owed
fiduciary obligations to Enron and its shareholders, and that they
breached those "duties by 'cooking' Enron's books and engaging in
the fraudulent 'sale' of barges to Merrill Lynch .... 132 This, Judge
Reavley asserted, "should [have] end[ed] the matter."' 3
This Note agrees with the dissent that the defendants should have
been convicted under established federal law and that the majority's
justification for adopting a new restriction is unpersuasive. However,
reaching this conclusion requires a deeper analysis than the dissent
offered. This Note seeks to prove the dissent correct.
IV
ANALYSIS
A. The Brown Rule
Despite the Brown court's claim that it was applying existing law,
the court in fact created a new rule. Although possible rationales for
the rule exist, the rationale on which the court relied is flawed be-
cause it overlooks the interests of shareholders, who must be included
in the analysis of honest services fraud in the context of a public
corporation.
1. A New Rule
The new rule in Brown is not easy to explain. An initial source of
confusion is the court's suggestion that it applied existing law. After
reciting the Rybicki rule and noting that Rybicki groups honest services
cases into two categories, bribery/kickbacks and self-dealing, the court
argued that the facts in Brown were distinguishable because "the only
personal benefit or incentive originated with Enron itself-not from a
third party as in the case of bribery or kickbacks, nor from one's own
business affairs outside the fiduciary relationship as in the case of self-
dealing."' 13 4 It proceeded to find that the defendants' "conduct [was]
beyond the reach of the honest-services theory of fraud as it ha[d]
hitherto been aplied.'135
The court's conclusion, that Brown falls outside the categories
that Rybicki listed merely because the benefit that accrued to the de-
131 Id. at 532 (Reavley, J., dissenting in part).
1-32 Id. at 533.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 522 (majority opinion).
135 Id. (emphasis added).
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fendants originated with the employer itself, is unconvincing. 136 In
United States v. Gray,137 the Fifth Circuit found an honest services viola-
tion where university basketball coaches fraudulently established the
academic eligibility of transfer students recruited to play on the
team. 138 In that case, the only benefit that accrued to the defendants
originated with the employer, and the defendant's actions benefited
the employer by improving the quality of the team. 139 To distinguish
Gray, the Brown court noted that the university offered "nothing akin
to Enron's corporate incentive policy coupled with senior executive
support for the deal."1 40 The problem with this argument is that it
overlooks the underlying similarity between Gray and Brown. In both
cases, the employer itself was the source of the defendants' benefit,
and the defendants' conduct furthered the employer's interests.
Moreover, the court placed undue emphasis on the categories identi-
fied in Rybicki. Even if the defendants' conduct cannot be described
neatly as involving bribery, kickbacks, or self-dealing, that should not
be dispositive because those categories are not meant to be
exhaustive.141
2. Searching for a Rationale
Assuming that Brown created a new restriction on honest services
fraud, the next difficulty is explaining the rationale guiding the new
rule and how it operates. Two appealing options are that the rule
exculpates defendants who lack the requisite mens rea, or that the
136 A simple hypothetical reveals the speciousness of the court's reasoning. Imagine
Bob, a clothing salesperson employed by Ernon. Ernon's policy is that each salesperson
should sell as much clothing as possible. To encourage the salespeople, Ernon pays each a
10 percent commission. Bob needs $500 to repay a looming debt. Jane, Bob's friend,
enters the store and buys a $5000 suit, thereby earning Bob a $500 commission which he
uses to pay off his debt. Jane then returns the suit. To reclaim the commission it previ-
ously paid, Ernon withholds $500 from Bob's next paycheck. Bob pays Jane a fee for her
efforts. The result: Ernon has not been permanently deprived of money or property, Jane
has made some money, and Bob has paid off his debt. Is there truly no harm? No, it seems
clear that Ernon has been deprived of Bob's honest services and that Bob orJane or both
should be guilty of honest services fraud (assuming the mails or wires were used in further-
ance of the scheme). The mere fact that the benefit that accrued to Bob originated with
his employer changes nothing. Nor is it of any import that Bob's actions were nominally in
furtherance of Ernon's policy that each salesperson should sell as much clothing as possi-
ble. Although this hypothetical does not perfectly mirror the facts in Brown, it does suggest
that the reasons given by the court to distinguish Brown from other honest services cases
are unpersuasive.
137 96 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 1996).
138 Id. at 774-75.
139 Id. at 775.
140 Brown, 459 F.3d at 523 n.13.
141 See id. at 532 n.1 (Reavley, J., concurring in part) ("[H]onest services fraud is not
limited to those categories, and any implication otherwise is unjustified."); United States v.
Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 154 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Raggi, J., concurring) ("I do not
understand the court to be limiting the statute's reach to the identified categories.").
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rule exculpates defendants whose fraud is necessarily immaterial. But
the court appeared to reject these rationales. Instead, it reasoned that
the rule exculpates defendants whose interests do not sufficiently con-
flict with the employer's own interests. This rationale completely
overlooks the interests of the shareholders.
a. Lacking Mens Rea?
One possibility is that the rule is really a sufficiency of the evi-
dence restriction on mens rea. This would mean that whenever an
employee breaches a fiduciary duty, but does so to further a corporate
policy, the employee lacks the mens rea necessary to be guilty of hon-
est services fraud-in other words, such an employee is not morally
culpable. The problem with this is that honest services fraud is not a
distinct crime, but a way of committing mail or wire fraud. The mens
rea required for mail and wire fraud is simply the intent to defraud. 142
Courts widely agree that when a defendant breaches a fiduciary duty,
the defendant's failure to disclose that breach constitutes a fraud be-
cause the fiduciary relationship imposes a duty to disclose material
facts. 143 In Brown, the court conceded that the defendants committed
"a fiduciary breach-the failure to disclose the full truth about the
barge transaction."'144 Thus, the requisite mens rea existed.
b. Lacking Materiality?
Another possibility is that the Brown rule is based on the material-
ity element of honest services fraud. 145 Such a rule would mean that
when a defendant breaches a fiduciary duty, but does so to further a
corporate policy, the breach is necessarily not material. Although this
makes some intrinsic sense, the court explicitly rejected this rationale
by conceding the materiality of the defendants' fraud. The court
agreed with the Government that the defendants failed "to disclose
material information-that the barge transaction presented no risk to
142 United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 509 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v.
Owens, 301 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 2002)); Perryman, supra note 32, at 721-22. The gov-
ernment does not need to prove that an actual injury occurred. See United States v.
Naiman, 211 F.3d 40, 49 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 441 (8th Cir.
1996).
143 See United States v. Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 211-12 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v.
Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Dowling, 739 F.2d 1445, 1449
(9th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 207 (1985); see also Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (applying the same rule to securities fraud). See generally
Paul Mogin, Reining in the Mail Fraud Statute, THE CHAMPION, May 2002, at 12, 16-17 (exam-
ining nondisclosure and "[o] ther settled aspects of fraud at common law").
144 Brown, 459 F.3d at 520.
145 See Perryman, supra note 32, at 718.
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Merrill because of the oral side deal."' 46 Thus, the Brown rule does
not establish that fiduciary breaches which further corporate policies
are necessarily immaterial.
With respect to both mens rea and materiality, the court's conclu-
sion is correct. The defendants in Brown had the requisite mens rea to
be guilty of honest services fraud, and their fraudulent conduct was
material. But the court missed the main reason why the defendants'
conduct satisfied these elements. As this Note argues below, the de-
fendants intended to defraud Enron's shareholders, as to whom the
nondisclosed information was material.
c. Lacking a Corporate Conflict?
The thrust of Judge Jolly's opinion reveals that his concern in
crafting a new rule was with the element of honest services fraud that
requires a conflict between the interests of the duty-breaching em-
ployee and the employer. Judge Jolly began by citing the Rybicki rule
requiring "an officer or employee of a private entity ... purporting to
act for and in the interests of his or her employer ... secretly to act in
his or her or the defendant's own interests instead . "... ,147 He then
noted that the Fifth Circuit "ha[d] couched [its] language more
broadly in terms of an understood divergence, rather than a secret con-
flict, of interests" 1 48 and proceeded to explain that "'honest services
fraud' contemplates that in rendering some particular service or ser-
vices, the defendant was conscious of the fact that his actions were
something less than in the best interests of the employer."' 149 Moving
to the facts in Brown, the court found that "Enron's legitimate inter-
ests were not so clearly distinguishable from the corporate goals com-
municated to the [d]efendants."1 50 From here, the court found that
each defendant "perceive [d] his pursuit of that goal as mutually bene-
fiting him and his employer," and thus concluded that the conduct
did not constitute honest services fraud.151 Thus, it appears that the
court viewed its rule as foreclosing honest services fraud liability when
a defendant's fiduciary breach furthers a corporate policy because, in
such cases, any divergence of interests between the employee and the
employer is per se insufficient.
146 Brown, 459 F.3d at 520. It is clear that the court accepted the Government's allega-
tions regarding materiality because the court later concluded "that the scheme as alleged
falls outside the scope of honest-services fraud." Id. at 522 (emphasis added).
147 Id. at 521 (omissions in original) (quoting United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124,
141-42 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
148 Id.
149 Id. (quoting United States v. Bnmley, 116 F.3d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1997) (en
banc)).
150 Id. at 522.
151 Id.
460 [Vol. 93:437
THE CASE OF THE MISSING SHAREHOLDERS
The fundamental flaw in this view is that it conceives of "the em-
ployer"-the entity to whom honest services are owed-as consisting
solely of the corporate managers. The court first assumed that the
defendants breached their fiduciary duties to their employer. It next
assumed that they were doing so pursuant to a corporate policy. From
these premises, the court concluded that, despite the fiduciary
breach, the defendant employees' interests did not diverge sufficiently
from the employer's interests because they were furthering a corpo-
rate policy. But in order to draw that conclusion, it is necessary to
additionally assume that the employer's interests were identical to the
interests of the persons who promulgated the given corporate policy.
This is where the argument collapses. The defendants in Brown owed
honest services to Enron as an entity, not merely to the corporate
managers, and even if they did not commit honest services fraud vis-A-
vis the Enron managers, they did commit honest services fraud vis-A-vis
the shareholders.
B. Bringing Shareholders Back into the Picture
The defendants in Brown owed their honest services to Enron as a
whole, including its shareholders. This argument proceeds in two
steps. First, the core basis for honest services liability is a fiduciary
relationship, and the defendants here were fiduciaries of Enron's
shareholders. Second, this conceptualization of honest services fraud
accords with Congress's intent in enacting § 1346.
1. Executives as Fiduciaries of Shareholders
Although the meaning of "honest services" is a matter of some
debate, it is clear that it encompasses fiduciary duties.1 52 It is a funda-
mental principle of agency law that agents owe fiduciary duties to
their principals. 153 In the context of corporations, officers and direc-
tors are fiduciaries of the corporation and its shareholders. 154 The
152 See id. at 519 (" "'Honest services" are services owed to an employer under state law,'
including fiduciary duties defined by the employer-employee relationship." (internal cita-
tions omitted)); United States v. deVegter, 198 F.3d 1324, 1330 n.7 (11th Cir. 1999) ("It is
clear that a breach of a fiduciary duty... is sufficient to state a private sector violation of
§ 1346. Most private sector § 1346 honest services fraud cases decided in the other Cir-
cuits... have involved breaches of fiduciary duties."); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346,
368 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The prosecution must prove that the employee intended to breach a
fiduciary duty ....").
153 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) ("An agent has a fiduciary duty
to act loyally for the principal's benefit in all matters connected with the agency
relationship.").
154 See United Artists Theatre Co. v. Walton, 315 F.3d 217, 230 n.14 (3d Cir. 2003)
(" [D] irectors and officers are fiduciaries of the corporations they serve ...."); 18B Am. JUR.
2D Corporations § 1460 (2004) (referring to the "basic fiduciary duty of a corporate officer
to deal fairly and in good faith with stockholders"); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 562 (2007)
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Enron employees who executed the Nigerian Barge Transaction were
Fastow (the CFO) and Boyle (the Vice President in Global Finance),
both top executives. As fiduciaries of Enron, they owed Enron their
honest services. This, in turn, meant that they owed honest services
not only to the top corporate managers, such as the president, the
chief executive officer, and the board of directors, but rather to the
entire corporation, including its owners-the shareholders.
In the corporate context, a complete analysis of whether a defen-
dant employee has deprived the employer of honest services must in-
clude an evaluation of the defendant's actions with respect to the
shareholders. In many cases, it may be unnecessary to reach this sec-
ond analytical step because a dishonest employee is generally harmful
to all constituents of a corporation, managers and shareholders alike.
But this will not always be the case, and it certainly was not the case in
Brown. If a defendant has defrauded or otherwise harmed the share-
holders, the mere fact that the defendant was furthering a manageri-
ally set policy does not mean that the defendant has complied with
the defendant's obligation to provide honest services to the corpora-
tion. By harming shareholders, the defendant subjects the corpora-
tion to the significant risk of shareholder litigation. 55 This risk
constitutes a detriment to the employer. Especially when combined
with the personal benefit to the duty-breaching defendant, this suf-
fices to establish honest services fraud.
2. Shareholders as Private Sector "Citizens"
The above argument assumes that a fiduciary duty is sufficient to
create a duty to provide honest services. To bolster the argument that
the defendants in Brown owed honest services to Enron's sharehold-
ers, this section argues that such a conclusion comports with the pur-
pose of § 1346.
In the typical case, it may be unnecessary to analyze whether an
employee has committed honest services fraud vis-a-vis the sharehold-
ers as opposed to the managers because generally managers and
shareholders share the same interest in ridding the corporation of dis-
honest employees. But the Brown court recognized that its facts were
"exceptional" because the employees who breached their fiduciary du-
ties did so pursuant to a corporate policy.' 56 Yet, by overlooking the
interests of shareholders and concluding that the defendants' con-
("Directors and officers have a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its stockholders."
(citations omitted)).
155 See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REv. 859, 860-62 (2003) (discussing the increased
prominence of federal shareholder suits for securities fraud).
156 Brown, 459 F.3d at 522.
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duct fell "outside the scope of honest-services fraud,"1 57 the court ex-
culpated dishonest employees because the corporate fraud ran to the
top. This result is ironic because in cases of large-scale corporate
fraud, shareholders cannot rely on management to take appropriate
action and thus are in particular need of federal regulatory oversight.
Yet it is only in these cases that the Brown court found the conduct
outside the scope of honest services fraud.
This result is not only unfair, but it also contravenes the purpose
of § 1346. Congress enacted § 1346 in response to McNally, a case
involving public-sector honest services fraud. 15 8 Through this statute,
Congress intended to enable the federal government to prosecute
state and local corruption-the theory being that such federal over-
sight was necessary to adequately protect individual citizens from
frauds perpetrated by public officials.1 59 Section 1346 has been ap-
plied by analogy to the private sector. 160 In the private sector, share-
holders, more than any other constituency, most closely resemble
individual citizens from the public sector. Individual citizens have a
vital interest in their government but have little power to control it
other than by voting. 16 Similarly, in a corporation, shareholders are
keenly affected by corporate governance, but usually have no power to
exert control other than by voting.' 62 Just as public officials owe a
fiduciary duty to citizens, 1 63 so too do corporate officers and directors
owe fiduciary duties to shareholders. 164 And in both cases, § 1346
exists to permit the federal government to prosecute those persons
157 Id.
158 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987); see supra Part I.D.
159 Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution of State and Local Corruption,
92 Ky. L.J. 75, 145 (2003) ("The federal interest includes the prosecution of public corrup-
tion, and § 1346 is a clear congressional mandate that federal authority can be used to
police misconduct by state and local officials."); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Corruption and Feder-
alism: (When) Do Federal Criminal Prosecutions Improve Non-Federal Democracy , 6 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 113, 137 (2005) ("It is well-established that [§ 1346] was intended to criminal-
ize at least some forms of 'corrupt' behavior by non-federal officials.").
160 See United States v. deVegter, 198 F.3d 1324, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that
the "paradigm case of honest services fraud is the bribery of a public official," but that
§ 1346 has been "extend[ed] to the defrauding of some private sector duties of loyalty");
Modern Mail Fraud, supra note 12, at 428 (explaining the evolution and differentiation of
honest services fraud in public and private contexts); Perryman, supra note 32, at 733
("Outside of the public-sector context, courts have struggled to apply the concept of 'hon-
est services' to private employment situations . . ").
161 See deVegter, 198 F.3d at 1328 ("'[I]n a democracy, citizens elect public officials to
act for the common good. When official action is corrupted ... the essence of the political
contract is violated."' (quoting United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 442 (8th Cir. 1996))).
162 See 18A Am. JUR. 2D Corporations § 622 (2004) (noting that shareholders exercise
their right to share in the management of the company by voting).
163 See United States v. Woodard, 459 F.3d 1078, 1086 (l1th Cir. 2006) ("[A]s a public
official, [the defendant] owed a fiduciary duty to the public to make governmental deci-
sions in the public's best interest ...." (footnote omitted)).
164 See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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who abuse their positions of trust and breach their fiduciary duties.
The prosecution of the Enron executives who devised and perpe-
trated the Nigerian Barge Transaction, and the Merrill executives who
facilitated them, was a legitimate and justifiable exercise of this federal
power.
3. Defrauding Shareholders, Depriving Enron of Honest Services
The defendants in Brown perpetrated a fraud on Enron's share-
holders and therefore deprived Enron of their honest services. Fraud
may be established by either the nondisclosure of material facts 165
when a duty to disclose exists or by an affirmative misrepresentation of
material facts. 166 As the Brown court conceded, the defendants failed
to disclose material information about the barge transaction, specifi-
cally, that Enron orally promised to buy the assets back from Merrill
within six months at a fifteen percent annual rate of return.1 67 In
addition to this nondisclosure, the defendants also made, or caused to
be made, an affirmative misrepresentation. At the end of 1999, Enron
recorded in its financial statements that the barge deal was a sale from
which it booked $12,563,000 in earnings. 168 Because of the buy-back
agreement, the deal was risk-free for Merrill and was therefore a loan,
not a sale, which made the entry an affirmative misrepresentation.1 69
Finally, these nondisclosures and misrepresentations were material as
to the shareholders.17 0 The very purpose of a financial statement is to
communicate information about a firm's financial condition to the
general public; reliance is its raison ditre. Because a reasonable share-
holder may have decided to sell Enron stock rather than retaining it
or buying more had the shareholder known that the barge transaction
165 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (explaining that a fact is mate-
rial when there is a "substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important" (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976))); United
States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (explaining that a material
fact is one that "would naturally tend to lead or is capable of leading a reasonable em-
ployer to change its conduct"); Robert G. Vaughn, America's First Comprehensive Statute Pro-
tecting Corporate Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 24 (2005) ("[M]aterial facts are ones
that have the tendency or capability of influencing the decisions of the person or entity to
whom statements containing the facts are addressed.").
166 See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999) (holding that defendants' false
statements and failure to make disclosures constituted fraud); Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 146-47
(defining honest services fraud to include "a material misrepresentation made or omission
of information disclosed"); Vaughn, supra note 165, at 24.
167 United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 2006).
168 Id. at 515-16.
169 See id. at 516 (recognizing this as the Government's argument).
170 The conduct would also satisfy the reasonably foreseeable harm test in courts that
apply that test. See supra note 88 (listing cases). Undoubtedly, it was reasonably foresee-
able to the defendants that their conduct might harm shareholders if, for example, share-
holders who would have sold their stock decided instead to keep it, only to later see the
stock price plummet when news of the sham transaction became public.
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was a sham or that Enron had not, in fact, met earnings targets, the
defendants' omissions and misrepresentations were material. 171 Thus,
by defrauding Enron's shareholders, 172 profiting personally through
bonuses and fees, and thereby harming Enron by subjecting it to
shareholder liability risk and unnecessary fee and bonus payments,
the defendants were guilty of depriving Enron of honest services.
Returning to the Brown court's apparent rationale for its rule,
once shareholders are in the picture, the rationale's logic disappears.
The element of honest services fraud that the Brown court found lack-
ing because the defendants' actions furthered a corporate policy was
the requirement that the employee's actions be "something less than
in the best interests of the employer" 173 or that the employee's inter-
ests and the employer's interests sufficiently diverge.' 74 Although Fas-
tow and Boyle's interests may have aligned with the interests of
Enron's top corporate managers, their scheme was certainly not in the
best interests of Enron's shareholders. At a minimum, the defend-
ants' interests-earning bonuses and meeting earnings targets-"suf-
ficiently diverge[d]" from the shareholders' interest in obtaining
accurate information from Enron's financial statements.175 Because
shareholders are as much a part of the "employer" as are the corpo-
rate managers, this conflict of interests between the duty-breaching
employees and the shareholders establishes the very element of hon-
est services fraud that the Brown court deemed per se insufficient.
C. The Rule as an Affirmative Defense?
The Brown court's justification for its rule is unpersuasive because
the divergence of interests that it claimed were insufficient were in
171 The importance of this materiality requirement should not be underestimated.
Facts that may be material to a corporate manager may not be material to shareholders.
Indeed, most dishonest statements and actions by average employees of a corporation will
not perpetrate a fraud on shareholders because it will not be material to them. Brown is
different because the employees were high-level executives and their statements were of a
type on which shareholders typically rely.
172 There need not be actual proof of harm to, or reliance by, shareholders, so long as
the conduct was capable of producing harm or reliance. See Neder v. United States, 527
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1999) ("The common-law requirement[ ] of 'justifiable reliance' . .. plainly
ha[s] no place in the federal fraud statutes."); United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 784 (2d
Cir. 1985) (holding that the government does not need to prove that the scheme resulted
in a direct, tangible loss to the victims).
173 Brown, 459 F.3d at 521 (quoting United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 734 (5th
Cir. 1997) (en banc)).
174 Id.
175 Judge Jolly notes that the defendants' "breach ... resulted in an increase in En-
ron's stock price, an immediate benefit Enron specifically sought." Id. at 520 n.8. But as
the dissent correctly responds, "[T]he barge transaction did not serve the purpose of En-
ron's shareholders .... [F]alsifying Enron's books does not serve a legitimate corporate
purpose, even if it temporarily made Enron's finances appear more attractive to the invest-
ing public in the short term." Id. at 533 (Reavley, J., dissenting in part).
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fact more than sufficient once shareholders are considered. However,
the rule may have more solid grounding as an affirmative defense. 176
First, this subpart explores the difficulty ofjustifying the Brown rule, in
its current form, as an affirmative defense. Second, it suggests a way
to modify the rule to make it more supportable.
1. Problem: When the Policy is Unlawful
As an affirmative defense, the Brown rule would mean that be-
cause employees are justified in following corporate policies, even if
all the elements of honest services fraud are established, a defendant
may avoid liability by proving that the fiduciary breach furthered a
corporate policy. The appeal of viewing this rule as an affirmative de-
fense is that it avoids the doctrinal difficulty of redefining elements of
honest services fraud to find that one element or another is not satis-
fied when an employee who breaches a fiduciary duty does so in fur-
therance of a corporate policy. However, the key problem with this
view is that it is wrong to assume that all employees, under all circum-
stances, are justified in following corporate policies.
Corporations cannot exist for an unlawful purpose,177 cannot
conduct their business in an unlawful manner, and certainly cannot
have an official policy that sanctions illegal or fraudulent acts. 178
Thus, because corporations must act within the bounds of the law and
in fact act through their agents, it follows that corporate agents-of-
ficers and employees-have a duty to further the corporation's goals
exclusively through lawful means. 179
176 As an affirmative defense, the Brown rule shares something in common with the
defense of "superior orders" in the military context. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 10.2 ("It is
an affirmative defense that the actor, in engaging in the conduct charged to constitute an
offense, does no more than execute an order of his superior in the armed services that he
does not know to be unlawful.").
177 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a) (3) (2005) ("It shall be sufficient to state... [in
the certificate of incorporation] that the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any
lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized .... " (emphasis added));
Jones Apparel Group v. Maxwell Shoe, 883 A.2d 837, 845-46 (Del. Ch. 2004) (interpreting
when a charter provision is contrary to law). I refer here to Delaware law because it is the
most widely used body of corporate law and because Enron was incorporated in Delaware.
See Bylaws of Enron Corp., (Feb. 13, 1996), http://contracts.corporate.findlaw.com/agree-
ments/enron/bylaws. 1996.02.13.html.
178 See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(requiring the board of directors to establish an information and reporting system to en-
sure employees are acting lawfully); PRINCIPLES OF CooRRAT GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b) (1) (1992) ("Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain
are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its business . . . [i]s
obliged . . . to act within the boundaries set by law .....
179 See 18B AM. JUR. 2D CORPORATIONS § 1166 (2004).
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The court in Brown relied heavily on the premise that the defend-
ants were furthering a corporate policy.8 () But what, exactly, was the
policy? Specifically, did the policy sanction, implicitly or explicitly,
fraudulent or illegal activity? The inescapable conclusion is that it
did. According to the court's own rendering of the facts, when Enron
encountered difficulties selling its barges, Fastow sought an "emer-
gency alternative" solution which led him to enlist Merrill by guaran-
teeing that Enron would buy back the barges at a fifteen percent
annual rate of return within six months.' 8 ' It is clear, both from Fas-
tow's experience as a financial expert and from his refusal to put En-
ron's buy-back guarantee in writing, that he knew the deal was
fraudulent. 18 2 Thus, the official Enron policy was not simply, "Do
your best to meet our quarterly earnings targets." Rather, the policy,
which the court called "benighted,"183 was more like, "Meet earnings
targets through whatever means necessary, even if fraudulent." This
was not a legitimate corporate policy. Because corporate agents owe a
duty to further the corporation's goals only through lawful means, 84
the mere fact that the defendants' actions furthered Enron's policy
cannot shield them from criminal liability because the policy itself was
illegal. Put another way, it is illogical to allow the Enron and Merrill
executives who committed honest services fraud to escape liability by
proving that they were furthering a corporate policy because, under
the circumstances, their affirmative obligation was to disclose the pol-
icy or to halt it.
2. Solution: A Rebuttable Presumption
To become a more reasonable affirmative defense, the Brown rule
must take into account whether an employee who breaches a fiduciary
duty in furtherance of a corporate policy has, under the circum-
stances, a duty to comply with the policy or a duty to desist. It may be
that, in the majority of cases, a corporation's official policy will not
intentionally sanction fraudulent behavior. Cases may also arise in
which, even if the corporate policy is unlawful, the employees who
further it will not know that the policy is unlawful or will not be in a
position to challenge it.
Therefore, the Brown rule should be converted into a rebuttable
presumption. Thus, if defendants can prove that they were furthering
a corporate policy, a legal presumption against honest services fraud
180 See Brown, 459 F.3d at 522 (referring to Enron's "incentive structure tying employee
compensation to the attainment of corporate earnings targets"); id. at 522 n. 3 (referring
to "Enron's corporate incentive policy").
181 Id. at 514-15.
182 Id. at 515.
183 Id. at 522.
184 See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
2008]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
liability should arise. 185 The court must then permit the government
to rebut this presumption by proving that the policy was fraudulent or
illegal, that the defendants knew it was fraudulent or illegal, and that
the defendants were in a position to disclose or otherwise frustrate the
policy. The virtue of this rule is that it mollifies the Brown court's
concern about turning every fiduciary breach into a crime1 8 6 while
still imposing criminal liability on those who are aware of the fraudu-
lent nature of their actions, have the power to take corrective action,
and instead willingly perpetuate the fraud. Under this rule, the de-
fendants in Brown would be guilty of honest services fraud because, as
high-level executives of Enron and Merrill, they were well aware that
the Nigerian Barge Transaction was fraudulent and they therefore
had a duty to disclose it, halt it, or, at a minimum, abstain from exe-
cuting it.
CONCLUSION
In Brown, the Fifth Circuit crafted yet another restriction on hon-
est services fraud, holding that an employee who breaches a fiduciary
duty escapes liability if the employee's goal-in addition to profiting
personally-was to further a corporate policy. First, this Note has
sought to identify and explain the court's rationale for this rule. Sec-
ond, it has argued that the court's rationale is premised on flawed
assumptions, and that if those assumptions are corrected, the rule
loses all justification.
The rationale that the court seems to adopt is that if an em-
ployee's actions further a corporate policy, then, notwithstanding a
fiduciary breach, the employee's and employer's interests do not di-
verge sufficiently to establish an honest services violation. The flawed
assumption here is that "employer" refers only to the corporate man-
agers who implement the policy. Rather, the "employer" is the corpo-
ration as a whole, including its shareholders. A duty-breaching
employee may perpetrate a fraud on shareholders even when further-
ing a policy that the corporate managers set. This fraud results in
concrete detriments to the corporation as a whole, such as by subject-
185 Although the Supreme Court has held that presumptions in criminal cases are un-
constitutional when they relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof, this rule would not
apply to the rebuttable presumption here. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 317
(1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523-24 (1979) (holding that a rebuttable
presumption is unconstitutional). Here, the prosecution would still need to prove all the
elements of honest services fraud beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant would then
have the burden of proving, as an affirmative defense, that the defendant was furthering a
corporate policy. This would then create a rebuttable presumption in favor of the defen-
dant. Unconstitutional presumptions, by contrast, burden the defendant. See Walker v.
Butterworth, 599 F.2d 1074, 1079 (1st Cir. 1979).
186 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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ing the corporation to the risk of shareholder litigation. Thus, the
element of honest services fraud requiring divergent interests is
satisfied.
A more persuasive, but also problematic, rationale may be that
because employees are justified in complying with official policies, an
employee can escape honest-services-fraud liability if the employee
can prove, as an affirmative defense, that the conduct furthered such
a policy. The flawed assumption here is that employees are always
justified in complying with official policies. When a corporate policy
sanctions fraudulent or unlawful conduct and the employee knows
this and is in a position to disclose or frustrate the policy, the em-
ployee has an affirmative obligation to do so. The rule becomes more
sensible if it is modified to create a rebuttable presumption that an
employee acting pursuant to a corporate policy is complying with the
obligation to provide honest services.
Section 1346 is, as many have argued, hopelessly ambiguous on
its face.' 8 7 Judge Jolly, the Brown author, pointed out many of these
ambiguities in his Brumley dissent.18 8 In Brown, he instead sought to
restrict the reach of the statute by crafting a new rule. Although the
extensive reach of § 1346 has certain costly consequences, the costs of
the Brown rule are far greater. For one, the rule comes at the expense
of consistency and predictability throughout the circuit courts. Doc-
trinal rationality also suffers because accepting the rule requires mak-
ing the flawed assumptions discussed above. The rule's final cost is
justice itself because, at least in this case, its effect is to exculpate indi-
viduals who committed outright fraud. A better solution would be for
courts to apply honest services law honestly and leave it to Congress to
amend the "facially vague"18 9 statute if Congress dislikes the result.
187 See supra notes 14 and 17.
188 United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 736-48 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Jolly and
DeMoss, JJ., dissenting).
189 United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 520 (5th Cir. 2006).
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